War may be the most complex of all human endeavors. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz argued that the best plans rarely survive contact with the enemy because of innumerable sources of “friction”i.e., miscommunication, weather, equipment failures, human error, fatigue, fear, and sheer luck inevitably accumulate. But above all, the enemy gets a vote. That’s the reality the critics of President Trump’s handling of the Iranian conflict appear reluctant to acknowledge.
It seems that every airstrike, drone strike, missile attack, diplomatic initiative, economic sanction, and fluctuation in oil prices has been analyzed, scrutinized, and dissected resulting in an echo chamber where every action, reaction, or inaction is portrayed as evidence that the president’s strategy is failing.
We hear “Iran is stronger now than before the conflict began,” “Iran is more emboldened,” or “Trump lacks a coherent strategy.” Such conclusions rest on the assumption that because the President has not provided a timetable for ending the conflict, he therefore has no plan. However, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich postulates that President Trump’s approach resembles General Winfield Scott’s Civil War “Anaconda Plan” at the start of the Civil War – a comparison worth considering.
Rather than engaging in decisive battles, Scott proposed defeating the Confederacy by blockading Southern ports, controlling the Mississippi River, and steadily strangling its economy and military capacity. Critics mocked the strategy as too slow and lacking drama. Yet historians regard it as the strategic framework that ultimately helped secure Union victory by emphasizing patience over spectacle.
Gingrich argues that a similar strategy is emerging against Iran. In his view, the United States is systematically degrading Iran’s military capabilities, constraining its economy through sanctions and restrictions, expanding a regional coalition, and steadily increasing the cost of continued resistance until Tehran is forced to choose between negotiation and continued deterioration.
A significant development supporting that view came little more than a week ago when NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte described renewed American strikes as “absolutely necessary” after Iran violated the ceasefire. Whether one agrees with every aspect of American policy or not, the statement suggests that some international opinion may be shifting in Washington’s favor.
Supporters of the Obama administration argue that the JCPOA was successfully constraining Iran’s nuclear program. But Iran’s restricted transparency, history of concealed nuclear activities, and repeated failures to satisfactorily explain undeclared nuclear material to the International Atomic Energy Agency should give us more than ample reason to be skeptical about its long-term compliance.
Meanwhile, complicating matters in today’s crisis, unlike the Confederacy, we do not really know who is making the decisions in Tehran. Meanwhile, the administration must balance world opinion, balking among NATO allies, the upcoming midterms, the safety of American forces, Israel’s security, Gulf stability, freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and the economic consequences of higher oil prices.
Like most Americans, I know only what has been publicly reported and have no idea how close Iran was—or is—to developing a deliverable nuclear weapon. But as incommodious as it may be, sooner or later someone had to stop kicking the Iranian can down the road and confront the mullahs. If Iran was approaching the capability to field a nuclear weapon, postponing that decision carried catastrophic consequences.
After World War II, historians repeatedly asked, “Why didn’t the allies stop Hitler at Munich when they had the chance?” A question that when applied to the 21st century is about the danger of allowing fanatical regimes to remain unchecked in their ambitions while hoping they moderate their behavior.
History never repeats itself exactly, but the lesson remains relevant: postponing difficult confrontations always makes them more dangerous. And nearly a half a century of unresolved hostility with Iran has brought us to where we are today.
Drones, cyber warfare, precision-guided munitions, satellite surveillance, and instantaneous media coverage have multiplied the variables military and political leaders must weigh, but they have not altered the fundamental nature of war. The enemy still gets a vote.
Critics of the administration understandably want measurable evidence that the strategy is succeeding. Yet wars rarely provide neat milestones or predictable timelines. Demanding a date-certain Iranian surrender, fixed terms for ending the conflict, or guarantees of no American or civilian casualties asks for a degree of certainty that no commander in history has ever been able to provide.
History will not judge this strategy by today’s headlines or tomorrow’s polling. It will judge it by a far simpler standard: whether it ultimately prevents the Iranians from acquiring a nuclear weapon and keeping the Strait of Hormuz open for all nations of the world. That’s an easy yardstick to use as a measurement – it just doesn’t come with a timeline.